INTRODUCTION
substantive law is bereft of pre-determined processes for compulsory adjudication -something often cited to raise doubts about whether international law is law. 9 The study of international adjudication procedures must always proceed from the awareness that there is no overarching system from which principles can be extracted through deductive reasoning. Any theoretical inquiry, therefore, must resort to analogies and inferences, whose validity can only derive from a close attention to the practice.
This article does not define procedural fairness but rather describes it. It asks where procedure comes from, what its functions are and why it matters in international law. Part I provides some theoretical coordinates of procedural fairness. Part II introduces procedure as a social construct, and highlights the function of fairness in this light. Part III discusses how procedure operates in the international legal system. It reflects on the theory of sources of procedural principles, as well as the conceptual dilemmas raised by States serving as parties in legal proceedings.
I. THE THEORY OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Procedural and substantive fairness are co-dependent but distinct, and studies show that humans conceive them separately. 10 Impartial execution of unjust laws can produce an unjust outcome. 11 Conversely, unfair or unwelcome outcomes are sometimes tolerable when they result from a fair procedure, 12 and just decisions reached through an unfair process can be resented. 13 Ultimately, that justice is done is not sufficient for the legal order to achieve social legitimacy and, in turn, authority and efficiency 14 : justice must also be seen to be done. 13 This is why, for instance, art 53(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to the ICJ's duty to determine its jurisdiction and that the claim is well-founded before ruling in favour of the claimant when the defendant does not appear. Gerald S. Leventhal, "What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study of fairness in social relationships", in K.J. Gergen, M.S. spaces in which democratic legitimacy may be generated," 37 rather than merely respected or reflected. Some contend, for instance, that procedures enhance democratic legitimacy through mechanisms allowing ample opportunities for the parties, including third parties, to bring their views in the process (e.g., through amici curiae and third party interventions). 38 However, even such adjustments would fail to mantle the notion of procedural fairness with a connotation of universalism. Instead, they would stretch fairness to second the needs, feels and values of the occasional dêmos, time and context. "Procedural democracy" in international adjudication would increase the legitimacy of the system but get the process off its hinges, subjecting it to contingency.
Emerging shared solutions in the administration of international justice might signal a shift towards unity. This trend apparently counters the stigma of self-containment that 34 Koskenniemi, supra note *, 136. 35 international jurisdictions bear, 39 with some degree of self-serving awareness. 40 The progression towards universalism, however, hardly exceeds the achievement of generic prototypes, especially in the field of international adjudication. The irreversible fragmentation of procedures reflects the functional differentiation of substantive international law.
International courts are established to operate in epistemic environments with specific
coordinates and values and their procedural rules are set and develop accordingly.
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B. The Theory of Procedural Justice
Rawls provided the most influential theorisation of procedural justice in modern times. He investigated the distinction between distributive and procedural justice, their interplay and how society influences both. Procedural rules fall into three categories, each contributing to justice in a different way: perfect, imperfect and pure procedural justice.
Perfect procedural justice implies the recognition of shared ideas of what is just. The procedure, deriving effectiveness from its close adherence to social conventions, is designed to achieve the realisation of those ideas. 42 For example, the procedural rule according conclusive evidentiary weight to in-court confessions builds on the intuition that, in our society, rational subjects rarely act against their own interests. 43 The rule reflects social conventions (which might not be universal): it presupposes and sets into a rule the notion that the culprit's confession relieves the victim from the standard evidentiary burden.
Imperfect procedural justice relies on a shared standard of justice without laying down the rules to achieve it. The norm that criminal sentencing should abide by the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" incarnates imperfect procedural justice. It codifies the social convention that it is fair to presume innocence and minimise the risk of mistaken convictions.
However, the principle alone cannot secure the goal it sets, it requires implementing rules. Pure procedural justice, instead, simply seeks to produce agreeable outcomes (or impede unjust ones) through process, without validating a pre-existing notion of justice. It relies on neutral conventions that produce fairness in the absence of a direct ethical criterion. The attribution of resources and responsibility based on coin-flipping or agreed codes (traffic lights) seeks to serve fairness through impartiality. Agreements reached through genuine bargaining are made just by the process, and if sports players play by the agreed rules the result of a game is inherently fair. 44 Similarly, rules regarding certain logistical matters of court proceedings (e.g., deadlines for document submissions, formalities of power of attorney) seek to ensure fairness through procedural conventions, which are fair because they are set in law, rather than the opposite.
Pure procedural justice can be framed as a process by which collective acquiescence generates the perception of justice: "[t]he justice of the outcome stems from [the parties'] joint acquiescence together with their right to acquiesce in the procedure". 45 It is self-evident that this link between fairness and consent (that is, the free exercise of a right) pervades the field of international adjudication. Part III, below, reflects on the difficulty to qualify this special acquiescence at the international level.
C. The Psychology of Procedural Justice
Since the 1970s, studies have examined the social psychology of procedural justice. 46 Scholars started measuring the psychological reaction to procedural arrangements disconnected from substantive outcomes. Without providing a recipe for fairness, these studies identified some reliable correlations. Dispute resolution is considered fair in proportion to elements such as the quality of the process of decision-making, the parties' control thereon and the dignity and respect that authorities afford to them. 47 Matters of participation and authorities' trustworthiness combine; for instance, people value their right to be heard only insofar as the authorities appear to take their views into serious consideration. 48 The correlation between these elements and perceived fairness is constant across societies. 49 However, their generality makes it impossible to derive from them viable standards, let alone precise rules.
Legal proceedings require self-reflexive regulation to ensure that the goal (the equitable application of law) is not frustrated by the process. This remedial aspect connotes, for example, the availability of provisional measures 50 and the notion of abuse of process. 51 The admissibility and evaluation of evidence is another field where the court's conduct, whether dictated by positive rules or ad hoc discretion, affects both the functionality of the process and its compliance with justice. 52 Yet, procedural rules might be incomplete or too vague (see above the idea of imperfect procedural justice) to indicate clear outcomes. The undercurrent theme of the interplay between norms and practice in the field of procedural law is that whereas norms must be designed not to hinder fairness, the actual achievement of fairness is not secured by the norms, but by their application in specific cases. 53 Conflicting principles can clash in the interpretation of procedural standards, and judges must prioritise between them (e.g., between
completeness and practical fairness, 54 or between expertise and impartiality). context. Whether proceedings are fair (and, therefore, functional) depends on the values of the community of reference: "there is contingency at the heart of value".
II. THE FUNCTIONS AND DYSFUNCTIONS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
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A. The Social Function of Procedural Fairness
There is no original procedural model, a historically plausible departure point for all subsequent evolutions. Legal proceedings of all times share roughly one function: replacing violence in the resolution of conflicts. This applies also to international legal proceedings. In this context, the relationship between the law and its social function hinges on the law's ability to reach its goals.
Koskenniemi proposed a "policy approach" to the critique of international law: international law is relevant if it furthers the goals that societies, including the international society, have set for it.
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In this sense, the typical goal of procedure, as intimated above, is to support the principled application of the law. This function is arguably a corollary of the rule of law 57 : the notion that public authorities follow procedure has a discrete value, as it promises adjudicatory efficiency and constraint of public powers. Indeed, effectiveness and social validation depend on each other:
For efficacy to deliver legitimacy, therefore, an actor must be effective in delivering outcomes deemed appropriate, and judgments about the appropriateness of effectively delivered outcomes are, like those of material might, made in relation to prevailing social norms. fix to a legal impasse is the principle of confidentiality of information covered by the "priestpenitent" privilege. The obligation of non-disclosure imposed by the Church on priests has been mirrored by a procedural privilege granted by the secular authorities, for centuries. 72 The nonadmissibility of evidence obtained by priests during confession, when religious doctrines shaped the public sphere, was given. Today, its currency is debated, 73 showing that procedural principles evolve (and dissolve). Bentham, in his treatise on evidence, 74 clearly accounts for the symbiosis between an essential feature of society (religion) and the currency of peremptory procedural principles:
In a political state, in which this most extensively adopted modification of the Christian religion is established upon a footing either of equality or preference, the necessity of the exclusion demanded on this ground will probably appear too imperious to admit of dispute.
Bentham's assessment of this procedural institution does not hinge on an attempt to measure "any comparative estimate of the bad and good effects flowing from [it]". 75 The starting assumption, and the inevitable conclusion, is that this principle safeguards the sacrament of confession and "catholic religion is not to be suppressed by force". 76 From the historical advocate of utilitarianism, this conclusion is revealing. Procedural law, for its pretence of neutrality, is not an exact science 77 and reflects the idiosyncrasies of the community to which it applies. The next section discusses the idiosyncrasies of international law and considers their effects on procedural fairness in international adjudication.
If procedural fairness is a necessary feature of law and adjudication, 78 is not necessity a sufficient source for its normative implementation? If not, what sources exist and how do they interact, especially at the international level? Given the individual-centred narrative of due process and its traditional reference to State-managed compulsory adjudication, what adjustments are needed to read its core principles into the system of international law?
A. The Sources of Procedural Law
The sources of procedural rules are manifold. In domestic systems, procedural rules flow from constitutional law, statutory law, sub-legislative acts and the inherent jurisdiction of courts.
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With specific reference to the latter, judges have the powers to steer, manage and moderate the process to avoid abuse, even in the absence of positive provisions. 80 A court must be "armed with the power to prevent its process being misused in such a way as to diminish its capability of arriving at a just decision of the dispute".
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This source is subsidiary to statutory and higher-ranked provisions. It fills the gap they leave open, and cannot override them. The precise extent of the powers that inherent jurisdiction encompasses is debated. A restrictive notion only includes the powers ensuring the existence and viability of proceedings, whereas an expansive view would aim to the guarantee of specific standards of fairness. Arguably, integrating the two approaches is possible if fairness is considered a condition for a process's meaningful existence (an unfair trial is a trial only in name). At least, the inherent powers should equip a court against the risk that procedure itself (or the lack of procedural rules) hinder its mandate to ensure the process's fairness.
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At the international level, the constituent instruments of an international judicial body, or its statute, contain the procedural rules. Sometimes, the framers entrust the body to set its own procedural rules. The exact operation of these sources in specific cases is determined through 78 "It would be nonsense to speak of the permissibility of an unfair trial", Patrick rule on their admissibility and its own competence, regulate the operation of the proceedings 91 and apply (or integrate) procedural rules. 92 Further powers (or specific instances of implementation of the above) might be controversial, especially in arbitration, where the process supposedly flows from the parties' fiat and implicit powers affecting the parties'
interests are harder to justify. 93 Alternatively, courts' power to govern the fairness of the proceedings through lawmaking might be considered to flow from the implied powers 94 of their framing institutions. In carrying out their institutional mandate to solve disputes, international judicial bodies enjoy the powers granted to their establishing organization, limitedly to the task. In other words, when their actions are appropriate for the fulfilment of the institutional purposes of their regime, they are presumed not to be ultra vires. 95 Thirlway provided a slightly different reading of implied powers, suggesting that they arise as a matter of interpretation of treaties. By using words like "court" or "tribunal", the parties must have meant to endow such entities, even implicitly, with the powers commonly attributed to domestic courts. 96 Appearance of partiality, for instance, is unsettling insofar as the concept of adjudication implicitly requires impartiality. 97 Thus, the exercise of inherent powers and unwritten principles is a delicate endeavour: one party will resent the effect of actions that are not grounded in black- For instance, the ICJ's practice in indicating provisional measures betrays awareness, even in matters of procedure, of non-compliance risks. 113 The NAFTA award in Loewen, an archetype of substantive injustice through procedural pedantry, 114 openly invoked the viability of NAFTA against justice-laden activism. 115 No international jurisdiction can light-heartedly expose its rulings to probable non-compliance, lest its fragile legitimacy be undermined. The reinforcing feedback between legitimacy and effectiveness in domestic adjudication can easily become a vicious circle at the international level, with procedural law in the middle. As Weiler noted:
… in the international sphere as elsewhere the end can justify the means only so far.
[A] legitimacy powerfully skewed to results and away from process, based mostly on outputs and only to a limited degree on inputs, is a weak legitimacy and sometimes none at all. 116 It does not help that fairness is perceived as a recessive value in disputes between parties of different social groups. 117 International law proceedings are, almost by definition, inter-group litigation. Therefore the parties -assuming that psychological patterns extend to States and legal entities -tend to value the fairness of the process less than the outcome's convenience.
Relative to domestic proceedings, the autonomy of international courts to shape and manage procedure is reduced, even if the regulatory gaps might be wider and more frequent.
The State, which acts as party in the adjudication process, is after all the ultimate paragon (through sovereignty and consent) of international institutions' lawfulness and effectiveness.
Hence, procedures must carefully adapt to the somewhat intractable dimension of sovereign
States. 118 The contingent arrangement of every procedural setup is ultimately a function of how much the international dispute settlement process emancipates itself from the States. 119 One aphorism illustrates the delicate management of this self-destructive yearning:
Leopards break into the temple and drink the sacrificial pitchers dry; this repeats over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance and becomes part of the ceremony. 120 The celebrants (international judges) are restrained in their celebration of the rituals (international proceedings), because they cannot bother the leopards (the States). Procedure tiptoes around sovereignty to a point where it is not clear whether its features are determined by the goals or the risks, according to a principled plan or in reaction to the circumstances.
Procedure is adaptive and, as such, serves several goals. The procedural order arranges itself around the facts, actors and goals of the process: "l'ordre, à la longue, se met de lui-même autour des choses".
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CONCLUSION
Even in the presence of obvious similarities across the various regimes, procedural rules are ultimately the deliberate choice of the framers of each. 122 For all the efforts to depict a universal model of fair trial, 123 a warning sounds true: "No one can describe the Procedure of the Future". 124 It is, however, possible to conceptualise procedural law at the international level as an autonomous discipline, which shares the feature of its domestic counterpart only to a qualified extent, and grows apart from it. Our task was to explain how little of the general notion of procedural justice can translate as such into the international legal system. This is the first necessary step stone for the study of an area of law which is under-theorised and currently monopolised by practitioners. A theoretical effort is indispensable to move beyond the current state of the scholarship; the ultimate goal should be to rely on doctrine to reform (rather than report) the practice, so as to increase the fairness of international legal proceedings.
law" of procedural law in international adjudication is largely a matter of treaty convergence and circulation of models. 123 Guinchard (n 12). 124 Tarde, supra note *, 704.
